Discurso del presidente José Mujica Cumbre Río +20 / 20.6.12

Autoridades presentes de todas la latitudes y organismos, muchas gracias. Muchas gracias al pueblo de Brasil y a su Sra. presidenta, Dilma Rousseff. Muchas gracias también, a la buena fe que han manifestado todos los oradores que me precedieron.

Expresamos la íntima voluntad como gobernantes de apoyar todos los acuerdos que, esta, nuestra pobre humanidad pueda suscribir.

Sin embargo, permítasenos hacer algunas preguntas en voz alta.

Toda la tarde se ha hablado del desarrollo sustentable. De sacar las inmensas masas de la pobreza.

¿Qué es lo que aletea en nuestras cabezas? ¿El modelo de desarrollo y de consumo que queremos es el actual de las sociedades ricas?

Me hago esta pregunta: ¿qué le pasaría a este planeta si los hindúes tuvieran la misma proporción de autos por familia que tienen los alemanes? Cuánto oxígeno nos quedaría para poder respirar?

Más claro: ¿tiene el mundo los elementos materiales como para hacer posible que 7 mil u 8 mil millones de personas puedan tener el mismo grado de consumo y de despilfarro que tienen las más opulentas sociedades occidentales?

¿Será eso posible?

¿O tendremos que darnos otro tipo de discusión?

Hemos creado esta civilización en la que hoy estamos: hija del mercado, hija de la competencia y que ha deparado un progreso material portentoso y explosivo.

Pero la economía de mercado ha creado sociedades de mercado. Y nos ha deparado esta globalización, cuya mirada alcanza a todo el planeta.

¿Estamos gobernando esta globalización o ella nos gobierna a nosotros?

¿Es posible hablar de solidaridad y de que “estamos todos juntos” en una economía que basada en la competencia despiadada? ¿Hasta dónde llega nuestra fraternidad?

No digo nada de esto para negar la importancia de este evento. Por el contrario: el desafío que tenemos por delante es de una magnitud de carácter colosal y la gran crisis que tenemos no es ecológica, es política.

El hombre no gobierna hoy a las fuerzas que ha desatado, sino que las fuerzas que ha desatado gobiernan al hombre. Y a la vida.

No venimos al planeta para desarrollarnos solamente, así, en general. Venimos al planeta para ser felices. Porque la vida es corta y se nos va. Y ningún bien vale como la vida. Esto es lo elemental.

Pero la vida se me va a escapar, trabajando y trabajando para consumir un “plus” y las sociedad de consumo es el motor de esto. Porque, en definitiva, si se paraliza el consumo, se detiene la economía, y si se detiene la economía, aparece el fantasma del estancamiento para cada uno de nosotros.

Pero ese hiper consumo es el que está agrediendo al planeta.

Y tienen que generar ese hiper consumo, cosa de que las cosas duren poco, porque hay que vender mucho. Y una lamparita eléctrica, entonces, no puede durar más de 1000 horas encendida. ¡Pero hay lamparitas que pueden durar 100 mil horas encendidas! Pero esas no, no se pueden hacer; porque el problema es el mercado, porque tenemos que trabajar y tenemos que sostener una civilización del “úselo y tírelo”, y así estamos en un círculo vicioso.

Estos son problemas de carácter político. Nos están indicando que es hora de empezar a luchar por otra cultura.

No se trata de plantearnos el volver a la época del hombre de las cavernas, ni de tener un “monumento al atraso”. Pero no podemos seguir, indefinidamente, gobernados por el mercado, sino que tenemos que gobernar al mercado.

Por ello digo, en mi humilde manera de pensar, que el problema que tenemos es de carácter político. Los viejos pensadores –Epicúreo, Séneca y también los Aymaras- definían: “pobre no es el que tiene poco sino el que necesita infinitamente mucho”. Y desea más y más.

Esta es una clave de carácter cultural.

Entonces, voy a saludar el esfuerzo y los acuerdos que se hagan. Y lo voy acompañar, como gobernante. Sé que algunas cosas de las que estoy diciendo "rechinan". Pero tenemos que darnos cuenta de que la crisis del agua y de la agresión al medio ambiente no es la causa. La causa es el modelo de civilización que hemos montado. Y lo que tenemos que revisar es nuestra forma de vivir.

Pertenezco a un pequeño país muy bien dotado de recursos naturales para vivir. En mi país hay poco más de 3 millones de habitantes. Pero hay unos 13 millones de vacas, de las mejores del mundo. Y unos 8 o 10 millones de estupendas ovejas. Mi país es exportador de comida, de lácteos, de carne. Es una penillanura y casi el 90% de su territorio es aprovechable.

Mis compañeros trabajadores, lucharon mucho por las 8 horas de trabajo. Y ahora están consiguiendo las 6 horas. Pero el que tiene 6 horas, se consigue dos trabajos; por lo tanto, trabaja más que antes. ¿Por qué? Porque tiene que pagar una cantidad de cosas: la moto, el auto, cuotas y cuotas y cuando se quiere acordar, es un viejo al que se le fue la vida.

Y uno se hace esta pregunta: ¿ese es el destino de la vida humana?

Estas cosas que digo son muy elementales: el desarrollo no puede ser en contra de la felicidad. Tiene que ser a favor de la felicidad humana; del amor a la tierra, del cuidado a los hijos, junto a los amigos. Y tener, sí, lo elemental.

Precisamente, porque es el tesoro más importante que tenemos. Cuando luchamos por el medio ambiente, tenemos que recordar que el primer elemento del medio ambiente se llama felicidad humana."

Chilecon Valley

ONE by one they came to the stage and pitched their ideas to the crowd. There was the founder of Kwelia.com, which makes software that helps landlords mint more money from their properties. There was the co-founder of Chef Surfing, an online service for people looking to hire chefs, and for culinary wizards keen to tout their skills. And the creator of Kedzoh, which has an app that lets firms send short training videos to workers via their mobile phones or tablet computers.

These and other start-ups, some sporting fashionably weird names such as Chu Shu, Wallwisher and IguanaBee, won rapturous applause from the entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in the audience. To your correspondent, who is based in Silicon Valley, it all felt very familiar. Yet this scene took place in Chile, a nation better known for copper-mining and cheap wine than for innovation.

Many countries have sought to create their own versions of Silicon Valley. Nearly all have failed. Yet Chile’s attempt is interesting because it exploits the original Silicon Valley’s weak spot—America’s awful immigration system. When the home of free enterprise turns away entrepreneurs, Chile welcomes them.


“Start-Up Chile” is the brainchild of Nicolas Shea, a Chilean businessman who had a brief stint in government. The programme selects promising young firms and gives their founders the equivalent of $40,000 and a year’s visa to come and work on their ideas in Chile. Since 2010, when Start-Up Chile started, some 500 companies and almost 900 entrepreneurs from a total of 37 countries have taken part. Start-Up Chile has doled out money to Chileans, too (see chart).

Mr Shea says he was inspired by his experience in America, where he studied at Stanford University, a wellspring of high-tech start-ups. “I saw smart people being kicked out of the United States because they couldn’t get visas to stay,” he says. “And I thought: why not bring some of them to Chile?”

Like several other countries, including Brazil and Mexico, Chile wants to establish itself as the entrepreneurial hub of Latin America. It has launched government-funded seed-capital programmes to back local start-ups and made it easier to set up a new company swiftly. Via Start-Up Chile it has also been importing foreign entrepreneurs, in the hope that they will inspire homegrown ones.

Getting handy in the Andes

The programme has been a big hit with foreigners, which is hardly surprising: they get to build their businesses with Chilean taxpayers’ pesos without having to give up any equity. Many rave about their time in the country, where they can write software code while sipping Pisco Sours (a favourite local tipple) and swapping tips with their peers. “The vibe is very Californian here,” says John Njoku, an American who is the founder of Kwelia.

Companies have used their cash for all manner of purposes. TOHL, a start-up that produces flexible piping that can be deployed from helicopters to distribute water in difficult-to-reach areas or disaster zones, says it has spent the money on things such as testing its new system with a Chilean mining company and acquiring a patent.

Start-Up Chile aims to have backed 1,000 fledgling firms by the end of next year, at a cost of $40m. It has already sired some successes such as CruiseWise, an online cruise-booking service, that have gone on to raise capital from other sources. However, it should really be judged by the two yardsticks Chile’s government set for it. Has it raised Chile’s profile abroad as a hub for enterprise? And has it inspired Chileans to start their own businesses?

Judged against the first of these yardsticks, the programme has undoubtedly been a success. Its current executive director, Horacio Melo, and his colleagues regularly criss-cross the globe holding meetings to encourage entrepreneurs to come to “Chilecon Valley”, as the start-up hub has inevitably been dubbed. Start-ups from some 60 countries applied for the latest round of grants. Chile’s experiment has spurred interest elsewhere: Brazil is planning to launch a similar programme to attract foreign talent to its shores later this year. “The public-relations part of Start-Up Chile has been much more successful than even we dreamed,” gushes Juan Andrés Fontaine, a former economy minister who gave a green light to Mr Shea’s idea.

Gauging the programme’s impact on Chile’s entrepreneurial ecosystem is somewhat trickier, but it appears to have had a positive effect. In return for the cash they receive, foreigners are expected to share their know-how by, for instance, coaching local entrepreneurs and speaking at events. Between 2010 and September 2012, Start-Up Chile participants held almost 380 meetings and took part in more than 1,000 workshops and conferences.

Pablo Longueira, Chile’s current economy minister, reckons that Start-Up Chile has helped to drive broader changes, such as a big increase over the past couple of years in the number of Chilean firms applying to other seed-capital funds run by the government, as well as a rise in the number of universities that teach students about enterprise. (The Catholic University of Chile, for instance, plans to open an innovation centre to enable academics and entrepreneurs to work side by side.) Mr Longueira also notes that Start-Up Chile has provided plenty of material for Chilean newspapers, which now devote far more space than before to entrepreneurs and their doings.

Mixing Pisco Sours, and ideas

Since Start-Up Chile opened its coffers to locals, it has inspired plenty of them to try to turn their wacky ideas into businesses. Almost 40% of the most recent round of applications were from Chilean firms. Chileans who have been backed by Start-Up Chile say they have benefited from rubbing shoulders with foreign peers. “A Brazilian on the programme did all of our web development,” says Nicolas Martelanz, the boss of Motion Displays, a Chilean start-up whose software helps retailers boost revenues by putting more information at salespeople’s fingertips. Other Chileans who have taken part rave about the contacts they have made thanks to Start-Up Chile.


Not everything is cool in Chile, however. Local entrepreneurs—and foreign ones who might consider staying on after their time on the Start-Up project—face tough challenges. There are not enough private venture capitalists to support young firms with money and advice. Nor do Chile’s universities spawn start-ups nearly as fast as America’s do. Many ambitious start-ups in Chilecon Valley hope to graduate some day to Silicon Valley.

Another barrier to creating a vibrant start-up culture is Chile’s harsh bankruptcy regime, which makes it hard for those who fail to start afresh. Also, the economy is dominated by a few vast business empires and an extremely conservative bureaucracy. Ironically, this is threatening to stifle a peer-to-peer lending business that Mr Shea, Start-Up Chile’s founding father, recently launched (see box).

There are some signs that things could change for the better. For instance, a bill that will dramatically improve Chile’s bankruptcy regime is wending its way through the legislative process. Mr Longueira is optimistic that it will pass by the end of the year. But Chile will still find it tough to match Brazil, which boasts a massive domestic market and a more developed venture-capital industry. Brazil’s bureaucracy may be worse than Chile’s, but its economy is more entrepreneurial and ten times bigger.

Hernan Cheyre, the boss of CORFO, a government body that oversees Start-Up Chile and other initiatives to support entrepreneurs, argues that while Brazil will inevitably be seen as the China of Latin America given its size, Chile can become the region’s Singapore, which has prospered by welcoming foreign talent and providing businesses with a stable, well-regulated base for their operations throughout Asia.

Singapore, however, has a long track record. Start-Up Chile is only two years old, and it is closely identified with the current centre-right government, which may be turfed out at the polls next year. A new government could axe it.

Whichever party wins, José Miguel Musalem of Aurus, a Chilean venture-capital firm, says he hopes that Start-Up Chile survives. It has already delivered one hefty benefit, he says: “Chileans have seen what smart graduates of Stanford and other leading universities can do, and said to themselves: ‘Hey, I could do that too’.” If Start-Up Chile spurs locals to think big, that would be no small achievement.

Inequality And The World Economy (The Economist)

True Progressivism


BY THE end of the 19th century, the first age of globalisation and a spate of new inventions had transformed the world economy. But the “Gilded Age” was also a famously unequal one, with America’s robber barons and Europe’s “Downton Abbey” classes amassing huge wealth: the concept of “conspicuous consumption” dates back to 1899. The rising gap between rich and poor (and the fear of socialist revolution) spawned a wave of reforms, from Theodore Roosevelt’s trust-busting to Lloyd George’s People’s Budget. Governments promoted competition, introduced progressive taxation and wove the first threads of a social safety net. The aim of this new “Progressive era”, as it was known in America, was to make society fairer without reducing its entrepreneurial vim.

Modern politics needs to undergo a similar reinvention—to come up with ways of mitigating inequality without hurting economic growth. That dilemma is already at the centre of political debate, but it mostly produces heat, not light. Thus, on America’s campaign trail, the left attacks Mitt Romney as a robber baron and the right derides Barack Obama as a class warrior. In some European countries politicians have simply given in to the mob: witness François Hollande’s proposed 75% income-tax rate. In much of the emerging world leaders would rather sweep the issue of inequality under the carpet: witness China’s nervous embarrassment about the excesses of Ferrari-driving princelings, or India’s refusal to tackle corruption.

At the core, there is a failure of ideas. The right is still not convinced that inequality matters. The left’s default position is to raise income-tax rates for the wealthy and to increase spending still further—unwise when sluggish economies need to attract entrepreneurs and when governments, already far bigger than Roosevelt or Lloyd George could have imagined, are overburdened with promises of future largesse. A far more dramatic rethink is needed: call it True Progressivism.

To have or to have not

Does inequality really need to be tackled? The twin forces of globalisation and technical innovation have actually narrowed inequality globally, as poorer countries catch up with richer ones. But within many countries income gaps have widened. More than two-thirds of the world’s people live in countries where income disparities have risen since 1980, often to a startling degree. In America the share of national income going to the top 0.01% (some 16,000 families) has risen from just over 1% in 1980 to almost 5% now—an even bigger slice than the top 0.01% got in the Gilded Age.

It is also true that some measure of inequality is good for an economy. It sharpens incentives to work hard and take risks; it rewards the talented innovators who drive economic progress. Free-traders have always accepted that the more global a market, the greater the rewards will be for the winners. But as our special report this week argues, inequality has reached a stage where it can be inefficient and bad for growth.

That is most obvious in the emerging world. In China credit is siphoned to state-owned enterprises and well-connected insiders; the elite also gain from a string of monopolies. In Russia the oligarchs’ wealth has even less to do with entrepreneurialism. In India, too often, the same is true.

In the rich world the cronyism is better-hidden. One reason why Wall Street accounts for a disproportionate share of the wealthy is the implicit subsidy given to too-big-to-fail banks. From doctors to lawyers, many high-paying professions are full of unnecessary restrictive practices. And then there is the most unfair transfer of all—misdirected welfare spending. Social spending is often less about helping the poor than giving goodies to the relatively wealthy. In America the housing subsidy to the richest fifth (through mortgage-interest relief) is four times the amount spent on public housing for the poorest fifth.

Even the sort of inequality produced by meritocracy can hurt growth. If income gaps get wide enough, they can lead to less equality of opportunity, especially in education. Social mobility in America, contrary to conventional wisdom, is lower than in most European countries. The gap in test scores between rich and poor American children is roughly 30-40% wider than it was 25 years ago. And by some measures class mobility is even stickier in China than in America.

Some of those at the top of the pile will remain sceptical that inequality is a problem in itself. But even they have an interest in mitigating it, for if it continues to rise, momentum for change will build and may lead to a political outcome that serves nobody’s interests. Communism may be past reviving, but there are plenty of other bad ideas out there.

Hence the need for a True Progressive agenda. Here is our suggestion, which steals ideas from both left and right to tackle inequality in three ways that do not harm growth.

Compete, target and reform

The priority should be a Rooseveltian attack on monopolies and vested interests, be they state-owned enterprises in China or big banks on Wall Street. The emerging world, in particular, needs to introduce greater transparency in government contracts and effective anti-trust law. It is no coincidence that the world’s richest man, Carlos Slim, made his money in Mexican telecoms, an industry where competitive pressures were low and prices were sky-high. In the rich world there is also plenty of opening up to do. Only a fraction of the European Union’s economy is a genuine single market. School reform and introducing choice is crucial: no Wall Street financier has done as much damage to American social mobility as the teachers’ unions have. Getting rid of distortions, such as labour laws in Europe or the remnants of China’s hukou system of household registration, would also make a huge difference.

Next, target government spending on the poor and the young. In the emerging world too much cash goes to universal fuel subsidies that disproportionately favour the wealthy (in Asia) and unaffordable pensions that favour the relatively affluent (in Latin America). But the biggest target for reform is the welfare states of the rich world. Given their ageing societies, governments cannot hope to spend less on the elderly, but they can reduce the pace of increase—for instance, by raising retirement ages more dramatically and means-testing the goodies on offer. Some of the cash could go into education. The first Progressive era led to the introduction of publicly financed secondary schools; this time round the target should be pre-school education, as well as more retraining for the jobless.

Last, reform taxes: not to punish the rich but to raise money more efficiently and progressively. In poorer economies, where tax avoidance is rife, the focus should be on lower rates and better enforcement. In rich ones the main gains should come from eliminating deductions that particularly benefit the wealthy (such as America’s mortgage-interest deduction); narrowing the gap between tax rates on wages and capital income; and relying more on efficient taxes that are paid disproportionately by the rich, such as some property taxes.

Different parts of this agenda are already being embraced in different countries. Latin America has invested in schools and pioneered conditional cash transfers for the very poor; it is the only region where inequality in most countries has been falling. India and Indonesia are considering scaling back fuel subsidies. More generally, as they build their welfare states, Asian countries are determined to avoid the West’s extravagance. In the rich world Scandinavia is the most inventive region. Sweden has overhauled its admittedly huge welfare state and has a universal school-voucher system. Britain too is reforming schools and simplifying welfare. In America Mr Romney says he wants to means-test Medicare and cut tax deductions, though he is short on details. Meanwhile, Mr Obama, a Democrat, has invoked Theodore Roosevelt, and Ed Miliband, leader of Britain’s Labour Party, is now trying to wrap himself in Benjamin Disraeli’s “One Nation” Tory cloak.

Such cross-dressing is a sign of change, but politicians have a long way to go. The right’s instinct is too often to make government smaller, rather than better. The supposedly egalitarian left’s failure is more fundamental. Across the rich world, welfare states are running out of money, growth is slowing and inequality is rising—and yet the left’s only answer is higher tax rates on wealth-creators. Messrs Obama, Miliband and Hollande need to come up with something that promises both fairness and progress. Otherwise, everyone will pay.

Colusión

Tuve un sueño en que la Corte Suprema condenaba a 50.000 estudiantes por coludirse e impedir el funcionamiento de numerosos establecimientos educacionales.

Para una dictadura de izquierda esto es inevitable

Por Yoani Sánchez, la bloggera cubana.

Me quisieron impedir llegar al juicio a Ángel Carromero. Alrededor de las cinco de la tarde del 4 de octubre, un amplio operativo a las afueras de la ciudad de Bayamo detuvo el auto en que viajábamos mi esposo y yo, junto a un amigo. “Ustedes quieren boicotear al tribunal”, nos dijo un hombre vestido completamente de verdeolivo, para inmediatamente proceder a detenernos. El operativo tenía las dimensiones de un arresto hecho contra una banda de narcotraficantes o de la captura de un prolijo asesino en serie. Pero en lugar de tan amenazantes personas, solo había tres individuos que deseaban participar de oyentes en un proceso judicial, asomarse al interior de la sala de un tribunal. Le habíamos creído al periódico Granma cuando publicó que el juicio era oral y público. Pero ya saben, Granma miente.

No obstante, al arrestarme, en realidad me estaban regalando experimentar periodísticamente el otro lado de la historia. Vivir en la piel de Ángel Carromero cómo se estructura la presión alrededor de un detenido. Saber en carne propia los intríngulis de un Departamento de Instrucción del Ministerio del Interior. Lo primero fueron tres mujeres uniformadas que me rodearon y me quitaron el móvil. Hasta allí era una situación confusa, agresiva, pero todavía no tenía visos de violencia. Después, esas mismas fornidas señoras me introdujeron en un cuarto e intentaron desnudarme. Pero hay una porción de uno mismo que nadie puede arrancarnos. No sé, quizás la última hoja de parra a la que nos aferramos cuando se vive bajo un sistema que lo sabe todo sobre nuestras vidas. En un mal y contradictorio verso quedaría como “podrás tener mi alma… mi cuerpo no”. Así que me resistí y pagué las consecuencias.

Después de ese momento de máxima tensión le llega el turno al policía "bueno”. Alguien que se me presenta diciendo que lleva el mismo apellido que yo –como si eso sirviera de algo- y que le gusta “dialogar”. Pero la trampa es tan conocida, se ha repetido tanto, que no caigo. Me imagino de inmediato a Carromero sometido a la misma tensión de amenaza y “buen talante”… difícil sobrellevar algo así por largo tiempo. En mi caso, recuerdo haber tomado aliento y después de una larga diatriba contra la ilegalidad de mi arresto me quedé repitiendo por más de tres horas una sola frase “Exijo que me dejen hacer una llamada telefónica, es mi derecho”. Necesitaba una certeza y la reiteración me la daba. El estribillo me hacía sentirme fuerte frente a personas que han estudiado en la academia los diversos métodos para ablandar la voluntad humana. Una obsesión era todo lo que me urgía para enfrentarlos. Y me obsesioné.

Por un rato parecía que había sido en vano mi insistente cantaleta, pero después de la una de la madrugada me permitieron hacer la llamada. Unas pocas frases con mi padre, a través de una línea evidentemente pinchada y ya todo quedaba dicho. Podía entonces entrar en la otra etapa de mi resistencia. La llamé “hibernación”, porque cuando se nombra algo es como sistematizarlo, creérselo. Me negué a comer, a beber cualquier líquido; me negué al examen médico de varios doctores que trajeron a revisarme. Me negué a colaborar con mis captores y se los dije. No podía despegar de mi mente el desvalimiento de Carromero en más de dos meses lidiando con aquellos lobos que alternaban con el papel de oveja.

Una buena parte del tiempo toda mi actividad la filmaba una cámara que un sudoroso paparazzi manejaba. No sé si algún día pondrán alguna de esas tomas en la televisión oficial, pero organicé mis ideas y mi voz para que no pudieran ser transmitidas menoscabando mis convicciones. O les mantienen el audio original con mi demanda, o tienen que repetir la chapuza de sobreponerle la voz de un locutor. Traté de hacerles lo más difícil posible la edición posterior de aquel material.

Solo hice un pedido en 30 horas de detención: necesito ir al baño. Yo estaría preparada para llevar la batalla hasta el final, pero mi vejiga no. Después me llevaron a un calabozo-suite. Había pasado horas en otro que tenía una rara mezcla de barrotes y cortinas, con un terrible calor. Así que llegar al salón más amplio, con televisor y varias sillas, que desembocaba en una habitación con una cama realmente apetecible fue un golpe muy bajo. Solo de mirar el estampado de las cortinas, tuve el presentimiento que era el mismo lugar donde habían hecho la primera grabación que circuló en Internet de las declaraciones de Ángel Carromero.

Aquello no era una habitación, era un set. Lo supe de inmediato. Así que me negué a acostarme sobre la sobrecama recién tendida y a poner mi cabeza sobre las tentadoras almohadas. Me fui a una silla en un rincón y me acurruqué. Dos mujeres vestidas de militar me vigilaban todo el tiempo. Yo estaba viviendo el deja vú de otro, el recuerdo del escenario en el que transcurrieron los primeros días de detención para Carromero. Ya lo sabía y era duro. Una dureza que no estaba en el golpe o en la tortura, sino en la convicción de que no se podía confiar en nada de lo que ocurría dentro de esas paredes. El agua podía no ser agua, la cama más bien parecía una trampa y el doctor solícito estaba más cerca del soplón que del galeno. Lo único que quedaba era sumergirse en los abismos del “yo”, cerrar las compuertas con el afuera y eso hice. La fase “hibernación” derivó en un letargo auto provocado. Ya no pronuncié una palabra más.

Para cuando me dijeron que me “iban a trasladar hacia La Habana”, me costó despegar los párpados y mi lengua parecía salirse de la boca por los efectos de la prolongada sed. Sin embargo, yo sentía que los había vencido. En un último gesto, uno de mis captores tendió su mano para ayudarme a subir al microbús donde también estaba mi esposo. “No acepto cortesía de represores”, lo fulminé. Y volví a tener un último pensamiento para el joven español que vio torcerse su vida aquel 22 de julio, que tuvo que bregar entre todos aquellos engaños.

Al llegar a casa supe de los otros detenidos y de que la propia familia de Oswaldo Payá no pudo entrar a la sala penal. También del pedido de siete años hecho por el fiscal contra Ángel Carromero y de la condición de “concluso para sentencia” en que quedó el juicio de este viernes. Lo mío era solo un tropezón, el gran drama sigue siendo la muerte de dos hombres y el encierro de otro.

Henrique and Hugoliath (The Economist)

IMAGINE an election in which the incumbent routinely commandeers the nation’s airwaves for endless campaign broadcasts while his opponent gets just three minutes a day. The incumbent uses all the resources of the state—money, vehicles, buildings—for his campaign, and he has branded state social-welfare programmes as his own personal gift. He controls the courts and the electoral authority. His opponent’s supporters fear that the ballot is not secret, and that for those of them who work in the public sector, voting against the incumbent could cost them their jobs. That is Venezuela’s presidential ballot on October 7th. No wonder that Henrique Capriles, the opposition candidate, calls the contest between himself and Hugo Chávez, who has ruled Venezuela for almost 14 years, one of David against Goliath, and that one of his allies says that the election will be “free but not fair”.

Yet despite all these unfair advantages, Goliath is threatened. Although he rules as an autocrat and has hollowed out Venezuela’s democracy, Mr Chávez’s legitimacy derives from the ballot box. That is both his greatest strength—and his biggest potential weakness. Unlike his idol, Fidel Castro, Mr Chávez has regularly held himself accountable to the voters, and so far always prevailed. There are two main reasons for that. Even his biggest detractors would have to concede that the president is a political communicator of genius, who enjoys a unique rapport with many poorer Venezuelans. Second, he has been fortunate that his rule has coincided with an unprecedented rise in the price of oil, his country’s main export. That has allowed him to shower tens of billions of dollars on social programmes, and to deploy largesse in order to pose as the champion of the downtrodden throughout Latin America. Had it not been for the oil boom, Mr Chávez would surely have long since become a footnote in Venezuelan history.

A convincing challenger

But there are clear signs that Mr Chávez’s appeal is finally fraying (see article). And so it should: by any objective standard, he has squandered his extraordinary oil windfall. His regime is corrupt and incompetent. His hounding of the private sector has made the country ever more dependent on the state oil company, which he has turned into a bloated all-purpose development agency. Venezuela’s infrastructure is decaying. Unchecked violent crime has made it one of Latin America’s most dangerous places.

For its part, the opposition has learned from its travails. It has put aside past squabbles and united behind Mr Capriles. He is sensibly trying to close Venezuela’s partisan divide by promising to maintain and improve most of Mr Chávez’s social programmes, while pledging to crack down on corruption and boost the economy by seeking the foreign investment the president has shunned.

For all these reasons, Mr Capriles deserves to win, and he just might do so. Although most opinion polls give the president a five-to-ten-point lead, many voters say they are undecided. And although the campaign has been unfair, the electronic voting system itself seems tamper-proof.

If Mr Capriles does win, it will be up to the army and the rest of Latin America to ensure that the result is respected. The unpicking of Mr Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution would make for a difficult transition. Even if Mr Chávez prevails once more, he is unlikely to enjoy the sort of landslide he got in 2006. His health is uncertain and his pre-election spending binge will force him to tighten the purse-strings later this year. Win or lose, Latin America’s most controversial autocrat is a diminished figure.

Wishful Thinking

ALVARO VARGAS LLOSA: Ah, Los Chilenos - Opinión

En los dos últimos años, se puso de moda decir que Chile había pasado de moda. El estallido estudiantil desbordó largamente el ámbito de la educación. Parecía que la izquierda radical había logrado contagiar a la clase media chilena el rechazo al modelo liberal. La impopularidad del Presidente parecía anunciar que el país iniciaría el desandar de todo lo avanzado en dos décadas.

Todo era una falacia. El modelo goza de buena salud y la sociedad respalda el sistema de libertad y responsabilidad individual.

Conversé con el presidente Piñera hace pocos días por espacio de una hora y lo encontré exultante. Las Parcas parecen sonreírle: la economía ruge como león, su popularidad recobra bríos poco a poco aunque sabe que nunca será un hombre muy querido, las iniciativas educativas han logrado separar la paja radical del trigo mesocrático aislando parcialmente a comunistas y anarquistas, y los índices de desigualdad disminuyen gracias a la creación de 700 mil puestos de trabajo en los dos últimos años mientras que el sector más vulnerable recibe ayudas solidarias insólitas en la centro derecha “desalmada”.

Quizá más significativa aún es la macro encuesta del Centro de Estudios Públicos sobre asuntos que incluyen las actitudes de los chilenos ante la riqueza. Desmiente con rotundidad que los chilenos recusen el modelo liberal. La mitad de los chilenos atribuye la subsistencia de una franja de pobreza a la falta de educación, un 37 por ciento a la “flojera y la falta de iniciativa”, y un 28 por ciento a vicios como el alcoholismo. Sólo el 28 por ciento la atribuye a razones que sugieren problemas propios del “modelo”. La mitad de los chilenos acepta que haya desigualdad si los hogares mejoran su nivel mientras que un 73 por ciento cree, en distintos grados, que debe premiarse el “esfuerzo individual” aunque genere una diferencia en los ingresos y 77 por ciento piensa, también en distintos grados, que la principal responsabilidad del sustento económico debe recaer “en las personas mismas”, “no en el Estado”.Estas actitudes no son ya de tercer mundo, sino de primero. ¡Qué digo de primer mundo! Hay países europeos donde no habría en una encuesta semejante resultados tan claros a favor del sistema liberal.

No es cierto, pues, que Piñera, un hombre intenso y que no tiene una simpatía desbordante a la manera de otros políticos, haya volcado a su país, por rechazo a él, hacia el socialismo radical.

Me dijo que mantiene la fe en que hacia el final de su mandato habrá acabado con la extrema pobreza –que ha caído bajo su gobierno de 3.7 a 2.8 por ciento–, reduciéndola a menos del 1 por ciento. “Si mantenemos el crecimiento anual de 6 por ciento”, me asegura refiriéndose al ritmo de aceleración económica de los dos últimos años, “hacia el final de esta década tendremos un per cápita de 24,000 dólares. Si Europa siguiera como hoy, nos pondríamos por encima de Grecia y Portugal.

Mientras que Brasil se desacelera y Argentina sufre una crisis, Chile y Perú son los que más crecen”.

Cuando Piñera tomó las riendas, Chile venía de sufrir un terremoto que devastó la tercera parte de los hospitales y escuelas, y mucho más. El 80 por ciento de lo dañado está reconstruido. El país soportaba un desempleo de casi dos dígitos, la pobreza había crecido dos puntos porcentuales y el país exhibía cansancio a pesar de la inmensa popularidad de Michelle Bachelet (que se mantiene incólume porque, como dice Piñera, ha sabido mantenerse “apartada” de la lucha política en estos años). Hoy, la pobreza cae nuevamente a 14.4 por ciento y eso que en Chile no se mide a partir de una valla más alta que la del Banco Mundial.

La cereza irónica de la torta chilena es que, acicateado por la protesta, el gobierno ha hecho cosas poco derechistas en temas sociales, como aumentar el presupuesto educativo en 40 por ciento (si incluimos el año que viene) y ampliar las ayudas, incluyendo la cuadruplicación de becas para la educación superior y la garantía de créditos a sólo 2 por ciento de interés a todos los estudiantes de universidades e institutos con excepción del 10 por ciento más rico. Para colmo ha adoptado una versión chilena del programa de ayudas condicionadas que da vueltas por toda la América Latina de izquierda y otorgado un bono alimenticio para paliar el aumento del precio de los alimentos, algo que pocos gobiernos socialistas han llevado a cabo a estas alturas.

Chile está de regreso. Mejor dicho, no se había ido. ¿Bastará esto para que el oficialismo gane las elecciones en 2013? Es improbable a estas alturas, pero es igualmente improbable que quien las gane se atreva a revertir un “modelo” que, aunque tiene varias reformas pendientes, goza de salud. Qué aburrido, perínclita Camila Vallejo, ¿no?

Escritor y ensayista peruano.

Read more here: http://www.elnuevoherald.com/2012/09/01/v-fullstory/1290372/alvaro-vargas-llosa-ah-los-chilenos.html#storylink=cpy

A propósito de Assange. Por Fernando Savater

Transparentes abusos
De todo el asunto de Wikileaks, que espero sea por lo menos
rentable para sus promocionadores, lo único realmente importante
es que remacha la evidente imposibilidad de esconder nada en el
mundo actual: hagas lo que hagas siempre habrá una cámara
filmándote, escribas lo que escribas (a quien escribas y dónde
escribas) siempre terminará por salir a la luz pública. Como los
documentos sustraídos pertenecen a la diplomacia americana, nos
confirman que los americanos cuidan sus intereses, estudian mejor
o peor la realidad de acuerdo con ellos y procuran obtener ventajas
de los demás países: supongo que algo semejante habría salido a
la luz si los papeles hubieran sido de diplomáticos franceses,
rusos… o españoles. Si no, más vale despedirlos.
En cuanto a la relevancia de tales soplos, pues la misma que
garantías tenemos de su autenticidad: nula. Por ejemplo, este gran
titular: “EEUU desconfía de la capacidad de Zapatero para gestionar
la crisis”. O sea, como usted, como yo, como casi todos los
españoles. La noticia hubiera sido que el Departamento del Tesoro
americano considerase a Zapatero un genio de las finanzas, capaz
de sacar a su país y de paso a media Europa del abismo. Ese si
que sería un documento estremecedor, una amenaza para el
mundo libre. Afortunadamente, piensan lo mismo que nosotros. Y
en el resto de los temas, piensan lo que cualquier ser dotado de
razón podría suponer que pensaban, aunque a veces disimulan.
Como cada cual hace en su vida. ¡Bah!
De modo que Wikileaks es tan revelador en el terreno político
como el agujero de la cerradura respecto a la higiene íntima de las
personas. En cambio nos ha permitido conocer que gente
aparentemente razonable es partidaria de lo que llaman
“transparencia”, es decir el derecho de todos a saberlo todo: que no
haya secretos y reservas que puedan contrariar la curiosidad de
alguien…caiga quien caiga y perdamos en el camino lo que
perdamos. ¡Asombroso! Ateniéndome a mi experiencia personal: he
estado en muchos tribunales universitarios de cátedras o tesis que,
al ir a deliberar, invitaban a salir de la sala al público asistente, sin
saber que atentábamos contra doña transparencia; he asistido a
muchas reuniones editoriales en un gran diario, dando por supuesto
la confidencialidad de lo hablado y sin saber que pecaba de
antitransparente; por razones de seguridad llevo escolta policial y
confío en que no revele mis itinerarios por internet, aunque me temo
que habría interesados en conocerlos…por transparencia, claro.
Pues bien, las cosas claras. Hay dos tipos de transparencia,
la de gestión y la de opinión o deliberación. La primera es
imprescindible en democracia: queremos saber a qué destinan los
gobernantes nuestros impuestos, cómo defienden nuestras
garantías y derechos, cual es la justificación de sus decisiones
políticas, etc…; la segunda es una agresión totalitaria contra el buen
funcionamiento de las instituciones y la privacidad de las personas,
ocupen cargos públicos o sean simples particulares. Confundirlas
es parte de la actual imbecilización social, a la que no es ajena la
maquinaria espléndida pero a veces devastadora de internet. Última
observación: dejando aparte a Berlusconi, Putin, los hermanos
Castro y alguno más, no hay político que me resulte tan sospechoso
y tan poco fiable como el señor Julian Assange…y sus partidarios.

Fernando Savater

Paul Krugman vs Paul Ryan

An Unserious Man - NYTimes.Com

Mitt Romney’s choice of Paul Ryan as his running mate led to a wave of pundit accolades. Now, declared writer after writer, we’re going to have a real debate about the nation’s fiscal future. This was predictable: never mind the Tea Party, Mr. Ryan’s true constituency is the commentariat, which years ago decided that he was the Honest, Serious Conservative, whose proposals deserve respect even if you don’t like him.

But he isn’t and they don’t. Ryanomics is and always has been a con game, although to be fair, it has become even more of a con since Mr. Ryan joined the ticket.

Let’s talk about what’s actually in the Ryan plan, and let’s distinguish in particular between actual, specific policy proposals and unsupported assertions. To focus things a bit more, let’s talk — as most budget discussions do — about what’s supposed to happen over the next 10 years.

On the tax side, Mr. Ryan proposes big cuts in tax rates on top income brackets and corporations. He has tried to dodge the normal process in which tax proposals are “scored” by independent auditors, but the nonpartisan Tax Policy Center has done the math, and the revenue loss from these cuts comes to $4.3 trillion over the next decade.

On the spending side, Mr. Ryan proposes huge cuts in Medicaid, turning it over to the states while sharply reducing funding relative to projections under current policy. That saves around $800 billion. He proposes similar harsh cuts in food stamps, saving a further $130 billion or so, plus a grab-bag of other cuts, such as reduced aid to college students. Let’s be generous and say that all these cuts would save $1 trillion.

On top of this, Mr. Ryan includes the $716 billion in Medicare savings that are part of Obamacare, even though he wants to scrap everything else in that act. Despite this, Mr. Ryan has now joined Mr. Romney in denouncing President Obama for “cutting Medicare”; more on that in a minute.

So if we add up Mr. Ryan’s specific proposals, we have $4.3 trillion in tax cuts, partially offset by around $1.7 trillion in spending cuts — with the tax cuts, surprise, disproportionately benefiting the top 1 percent, while the spending cuts would primarily come at the expense of low-income families. Over all, the effect would be to increase the deficit by around two and a half trillion dollars.

Yet Mr. Ryan claims to be a deficit hawk. What’s the basis for that claim?

Well, he says that he would offset his tax cuts by “base broadening,” eliminating enough tax deductions to make up the lost revenue. Which deductions would he eliminate? He refuses to say — and realistically, revenue gain on the scale he claims would be virtually impossible.

At the same time, he asserts that he would make huge further cuts in spending. What would he cut? He refuses to say.

What Mr. Ryan actually offers, then, are specific proposals that would sharply increase the deficit, plus an assertion that he has secret tax and spending plans that he refuses to share with us, but which will turn his overall plan into deficit reduction.

If this sounds like a joke, that’s because it is. Yet Mr. Ryan’s “plan” has been treated with great respect in Washington. He even received an award for fiscal responsibility from three of the leading deficit-scold pressure groups. What’s going on?

The answer, basically, is a triumph of style over substance. Over the longer term, the Ryan plan would end Medicare as we know it — and in Washington, “fiscal responsibility” is often equated with willingness to slash Medicare and Social Security, even if the purported savings would be used to cut taxes on the rich rather than to reduce deficits. Also, self-proclaimed centrists are always looking for conservatives they can praise to showcase their centrism, and Mr. Ryan has skillfully played into that weakness, talking a good game even if his numbers don’t add up.

The question now is whether Mr. Ryan’s undeserved reputation for honesty and fiscal responsibility can survive his participation in a deeply dishonest and irresponsible presidential campaign.

The first sign of trouble has already surfaced over the issue of Medicare. Mr. Romney, in an attempt to repeat the G.O.P.’s successful “death panels” strategy of the 2010 midterms, has been busily attacking the president for the same Medicare savings that are part of the Ryan plan. And Mr. Ryan’s response when this was pointed out was incredibly lame: he only included those cuts, he says, because the president put them “in the baseline,” whatever that means. Of course, whatever Mr. Ryan’s excuse, the fact is that without those savings his budget becomes even more of a plan to increase, not reduce, the deficit.

So will the choice of Mr. Ryan mean a serious campaign? No, because Mr. Ryan isn’t a serious man — he just plays one on TV.

§

Let’s see if we can clear up a few things.

First of all, Paul Ryan and Mitt Romney are not the same person. They aren’t even related! Stop spreading rumors! Although they do sort of look alike and enjoy spending time together. Perhaps Mitt regards Paul as the sixth son he never had.

Ryan is the one who lives on the same block where he grew up. Romney is the one who lives above the car elevator.

Ryan is the one who spent his youth cooking hamburgers at McDonald’s. Romney is the one who used to enjoy dressing up as a police officer and playing fun pranks on his prep school friends. Neither one of them worked as a Wienermobile driver. Really, I don’t know where you get this stuff.

Ryan is the one who likes to catch catfish by sticking his fist into their burrows and dragging them out by the throat. Romney is the one who drove to Canada with his dog strapped to the car roof.

When it comes to the issues, both men are on the same page. Although the page does keep turning and you have to wonder how average voters can cope with all of the confusion.

Fortunately, polls suggest average voters have already decided who they’re going to support and, therefore, have no need whatsoever to try to figure out which page the Romney-Ryan campaign is on.

Practically the only person in America who claims to have no idea who he’s going to vote for is Senator Joseph Lieberman, who recently declared himself absolutely and totally undecided. People, do you think it’s possible that the entire presidential campaign is now being waged just for the benefit of Joseph Lieberman? On the one hand, that’s a real waste of about $1 billion. On the other, it’s exactly what Joseph Lieberman has been waiting for all his life.

Anyhow, about the issues:

Ryan is the one who requested stimulus money for his district, but he is sorry. The stimulus was a terrible thing, and Ryan had no intention of trying to glom onto a chunk of it. He thought he was just forwarding a constituent request for some ... constituent thing. Or four.

Romney is the one who hired undocumented workers to mow his lawn. Totally by mistake.

Ryan is the one who voted for a massive prescription drug Medicare entitlement, the Bush tax cuts and two wars without paying for any of them. He is even sorrier about this than he is about the stimulus.

Romney is the one who passed Obamacare before Obama. But it wasn’t the same thing at all because it happened in a state.

Both men want to make more big tax cuts that will be paid for with the closing of tax loopholes. They are in total, complete concurrence that the identity of these loopholes is not an appropriate topic for a presidential campaign.

Ryan is supposed to be the Tea Party hero and Romney is the one they hated so much they were actually willing to contemplate a Newt Gingrich presidency to avoid him.

But I’m not entirely sure we can trust the hard right to know what it wants anymore. This week in Florida, a Republican primary uprising knocked out Cliff Stearns, a superconservative veteran congressman who had campaigned on his efforts to kill off federal funds for Planned Parenthood and embarrass the Obama administration with an investigation into the Solyndra loans. That sort of bragging enraged the faithful by reminding them that Stearns was a Washington insider, and he lost to a newcomer named Ted Yoho.

Maybe Tea Party voters now only want to send people to Washington who will lack the capacity to get anything done. Personally, I’m kind of O.K. with that. Also, I like the idea of having a congressman named Ted Yoho, as well as the fact that Yoho describes himself as a “large animal veterinarian.” We don’t have many veterinarians in Congress, and you never can tell when a visiting heifer will come down with a medical problem.

All right, a little more about the issues.

Romney has a plan to make Medicare solvent forever. We know this because he wrote “Solvent” on the board at a press conference the other day.

Ryan used to have a plan to make Medicare solvent forever by taking it away from everybody under age 55 and giving them health insurance vouchers instead. But that was so 2011.

Now, Ryan and Romney are on the same page when it comes to Medicare, which is that it must be saved from the $716 billion in cuts President Obama wants to make over the next 10 years. Although that same $716 billion was in the budget plan that Ryan got the House to pass this year. But it’s not like he expected it to happen. “We would never have done it,” he told campaign reporters, desperate wretches condemned to roam the earth with calculators, endlessly searching for the Ryan-Romney page.

Carta a mis hijos cuando cumplimos 40 años de matrimonio. N° 4 y final.

	diario de viaje 4 09-09-2007 17:00 De atraques y fin de fiesta

Hijos,

Ayer Helsinki, hoy en Mariehamn, Finlandia. Aprendimos que los finlandeses también hablan sueco. Helsinki interesante con buen comercio, Mariehamn la nada misma.

En Helsinki celebramos nuestro 40 aniversario de matrimonio. Respecto a los atraques, este crucero era de pocos puertos así es que no hubo tantos atraques. No obstante, como sí hubo estadías largas, nos mantuvimos atracados muchas horas, lo que no tiene mayores implicancias salvo para algunas mentes enfermas o cuerpos deficitarios de caricias.

La fauna que viajó con nosotros, aparte de añosa se prestaba para chismear por lo diversa. Venía un doble exacto de Hitler, también un  caballero de unos 80, de andar dificultoso, acompañado por una platinada de cuarenta, exuberante de siliconas y botox, ella siempre de blanco, irradiando virginidad. Otra doble, esta vez de la Imelda Marcos, que se dio el lujo de rechazar la comida en cada ocasión. Muchos gringos gigantones, medio pesados, que salvo un ‘hello’ de mala gana, no se interesaban mucho por nuestras electrizantes vidas. Ellos se lo perdieron.

Participé en un el torneo de putting, ganando un premio que agregaré proudly a mi sala de trofeos.

Estamos con agudo síndrome de fin de fiesta, mal preparados para empezar a pagar por el agua mineral y las tostadas. Hoy es nuestra última cena a bordo y ahogaremos nuestra pena en tragos multicolores hasta olvidar que existe el mundo real.

Nos quedarán una noche en Estocolmo y dos en París para partir el jueves a nuestro no tan malo condo en Chicureo.

Sailing to Stockholm, cariños de papá

Carta a mis hijos cuando cumplimos 40 años de matrimonio. N° 3.

	diario de viaje 3 07-09-2007 19:00 From russia with love

Estamos zarpando de St Petersburg rumbo a Helsinki. Estuvimos tres días en la segunda ciudad rusa, con bella arquitectura, canales, y monumentales iglesias coronadas con cebollas de oro y colores.

Hace unos días, estuvimos en Tallin, Estonia, ciudad pequeña amurallada, la caminamos entera sacamos fotos y observamos que creen que los turistas son tontos a juzgar por lo que piden por sus souvenirs. Ni un dólar por ladrones.

Como notarán este diario está bien fome porque los excesivos maltratos de a bordo nos tienen resblandecidos. Además la KGB tenía interferido Internet, por lo que se me olvidaron muchas cosas agudas que iba a comentarles.

En nuestra estadía en St Petersburg tomamos 4 tours, todos muy bien hechos, con guías en inglés que hacen bien su oficio sin ponerle más color del necesario. La confusión que tengo de Catalinas, Nicolases, Pedros, Alexanders, zares y emperadores, los salva de recibir el relato de sus proezas. Lo que sí impresiona es estar en los lugares de estos países en que vaya que han pasado cosas. Un sitio de esta ciudad duró tres años, y sólo de hambre murieron 700 mil personas, si mi inglés no me falla. Mucha destrucción y reconstrucción.

El miércoles fuimos al ballet, tocó El Lago de los Cisnes, donde a pesar de mi pronóstico, me mantuve alerta, y no en suspenso como en aquel planetario de Londres. Harto bien bailan esas ñatas. En un toque de exquisitez de la organización del barco, tuvimos, post función, una interviú con la prima ballerina. Una flaca larga, buenamoza y tímida, que quería fotografiarse conmigo pero la bruja no nos dejó.

Hoy fuimos al museo Hermitage, grande, muy grande.

Uno de cada 10 o 15 autos es Lada, el resto europeos y japoneses. En las calles hay algunos avisos de Coca Cola, Pepsi, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Citibank, IBM, y cosas así, pero les falta comercio. No está ni Ripley ni el Líder.

Los de inmigración son unos jodidos. Sin visa no se puede pisar la ciudad. No obstante, a los pasajeros de cruceros nos dan un pase rojo, (resabios), siempre que se haya contratado un tour en el bote. Como hicimos 4 tours, entramos 4 veces a Rusia, obteniendo un pase cada vez. Aparte de comprar medallas y monedas antiguas, nos escapamos una vez al bajarnos del bus, y volvimos una hora más tarde. Un guiño mío a la rusa de la policía, y recobramos nuestra libertad a bordo. Es que un latino aquí mata.

Mañana estamos de aniversario de matrimonio, forty years, what a performance! Reservamos para el dinner el restaurant italiano donde tomaremos Chianti, con pastas y prosciuttos para iniciar los segundos cuarenta.

Besitos de papá

Carta a mis hijos cuando cumplimos 40 años de matrimonio. N° 2.

	diario de viaje 2 03-09-2007 17:00 mar báltico

Tenemos reservas para la Lobster Dinner del Sábado 1°. Para estar en forma no almorzamos más que un tentempié en la piscina. Allí, en las reposeras hay toallas y chales. Algunos se empelotan y toman el sol gélido de otoño, los otros, de sweater  y tapaditos, bebemos nuestro vodka-tonic matutino.

Pero…

El imperio contraataca. Ella dejó su ropa unattended en la launderette y alguna matona capitalista se la sacó húmeda para ocupar la máquina.  Tuvo que volver la chilenita a tratar de secar su ropa con la plancha. Se demoró lo suficiente para agarrarse un mareo que la destruyó. Chao lobster dinner, triunfo de los poderosos. Contra el imperialismo valdrán todas las formas de lucha. Marido ejemplar le cuidó los gómitos y le compró unas pulseras antimareo en la boutique. Le pregunté a la gringa de metro ochenta que atendía si ella le creía a esas cosas. Amenazante me dijo que en media hora se recuperaría. Intimidado, asentí y le agradecí su convicción, (un chopazo de esa gringa y somos dos los enfermos). Insólito, pero a los treinta minutos sacó el habla la cuasi occisa. El tercer día, ella resucitó de entre los muertos e hicimos vida normal, navegando por el canal Kiel, un canal man-made de 100 Km. de largo que se mete en Alemania para aparecer en el Báltico. Tiene exclusas para absorber los desniveles de las aguas, es angostito, y el buque va lento y en cola con muchos otros. En los bordes, alemancitos y alemancitas pasean en bicicleta, y más atrás se ven las casas costeras y potreros con vacas que mugen en alemán (dicen).

Así, después de un día Domingo de recuperación llegamos a hoy Lunes con navegación bastante plácida por el Báltico.

Atracaremos mañana en Tallinen , Estonia, lugar que, como comprenderán, estaba primero en mi lista de ciudades por conocer. Ya verán los estonios cómo aportan los chilenos a esa cultura. Al menos una pichadita les dejaremos.

Seguimos disfrutando las exquisiteces de abordo, y leyendo mucho, ya que después del desayuno quedamos desocupados.

Los recordamos mucho, esperamos que se manifiesten, Pablo, muy escueto que se explaye en alguno de los numerosos temas que domina. Tomás que afine su nuevo bote para que justifique la inversión, y que al menos acuse recibo de los mails porque si no se cumplirá lo que a sus espaldas murmuran sus hermanos que se quedará fuera del Trigal y de otras herencias hoy en demolición. Felipe, amo del universo, sostén de Claro y Cía, congratulaciones por la performance náutica, Bosé decía ‘ser segundo es perder…’ Nico sí nos escribió, ¡bravo Niquito! Te llevaremos de esas muñecas rusas que se encajan unas en otras. Pacita, mater admirabilis, amamanta a esa arpía de tu hija y búscate otra peruvian de remplazo. Manenita, un picapoto allí.

Papá

Carta mis hijos cuando cumplimos 40 años de matrimonio. N° 1.

	diario de viaje 1 01-09-2007 6:21 saliendo de inglaterra mar del norte

La excusa son los 40 años de matrimonio.

Salimos el martes 28 de agosto desde Santiago hacia Londres.

Pasajes en ejecutiva, otra cosa. Se puede dormir en cómodos asientos que se extienden casi totalmente.

Como siempre mucha comida y bebida, y cuesta controlarse para no pagar después con hinchazones, flatulencias y acideces.

La mamá resfriada con muchos mocos, yo superando mi gripe con un maravilloso Ketoprofeno recetado por el yerno médico. Justificó la carrera.

Londres con un clima grato. Tomamos el metro para ahorrarnos unas 40 pounds. Finalmente el hotel estaba a tres cuadras de la estación correspondiente. Nuestras valiosas maletas Tumi se desplazaron gráciles por las veredas de Piccadilly hasta alcanzar el 116 del Athenaeum. Fea fachada, magnífico hotel.

Covent Garden a pie, mucha gente, mimos, payasos, tragasables y demases.

Observamos que la pound ($1.000 +), es como un dólar en USA. Un viaje en metro ¡4 pounds! Es cierto que si uno paga 5.1 pounds obtiene un ticket para todo el día.

Cansados, pero no sin antes comer en un Angus Steak House, nos retiramos temprano y a las 9 PM estamos sleeping.

Dia 30, cultura en Tate Gallery, a ver a mi querido Turner y sus cuadros neblinosos. No estaba el de la locomotora que descubrí que estaba en la National Gallery.

Para cumplir con la segunda versión de la crema catalana en St Martin in the Fields, vamos a Trafalgar Square. St Martin cerrado hasta octubre por restauración. ¡Qué novedad en Europa! En fin, las segundas partes nunca fueron buenas.

Con hambre, nos metemos a la cafetería de la National Gallery, hamburger gigante para mí y Meat Balls de cordero para ella. Una cerveza amarga y tibiona para deglutir la hamburguesa. La cuenta: como 30 pounds.

Ya en la National Gallery una visita rápida. Turner me espera en su locomotora, Renoir y su cuadro de los paraguas pagan el viaje.

A estas alturas el shopping empieza a manifestarse como síndrome de abstinencia en la Ana María.

Fugaces visitas a las tiendas muestran que es posible encontrar saldos en oferta realmente baratos. Un polerón para Gaspar inicia el juego, disimulando la preferencia por la nueva nieta.

Encontré unos pantalones beige de 31 pounds en 9 y que, al pasar por la caja, quedaron en 5. Great deal!

Hacemos ‘saludable’ con protesta de la esposa que me obliga a salir de noche a buscarle galletas y chocolates. Encuentro nachos y Snickers que los devora como una homeless.

Día 3 en Londres, el furor shoppero es incontenible. Rumbo a Harrod´s. Bonita tienda. Nadie compra, poca gente, precios insólitos. Es el día del aniversario de la Diana, cada cierto rato piden 2 minutos de silencio por ella y el Dodi (hijo del dueño). Eso es gratis. A las once, gran despliegue, entra Al Fayed padre, rodeado de más seguridad que un presidente. Los vendedores de perfumes guardan sus cartoncitos fétidos y simulan una oración.

Volvemos a pie para quemar muffins y otras ingestas hacia el hotel, justo para tomar el taxi al muelle del puente de Londres donde está nuestro bote.

Observamos lo jóvenes que somos al lado de nuestros compañeros de viaje. Era sólo una primera impresión, hay también algunas jovencitas deseables.

Buen camarote, amplio, con walking closet, baño con tina, estar, terraza, frutas, tragos y servicio de muchachas filipinas 24 horas al día, ¿incluso aquello?

Cena fina, vinos chilenos y californianos, petit fours y todas esas cosas que tanto daño hacen.

Hoy 1° de Septiembre, intentamos hacer el laundry, pero las gringas prepotentes dejaron sus calzones cagados lavándose y no volvieron. Ana María, ser india pero no tonta, sacó esa ropa y puso la suya. Gresca arbitrada por un marido sensato que hizo ver a su wife el letrero ‘Don’t leave your clothes unattended’. Triunfo para el tercer mundo.

Continuará.

The Great Abdication By PAUL KRUGMAN

Among economists who know their history, the mere mention of certain years evokes shivers. For example, three years ago Christina Romer, then the head of President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers, warned politicians not to re-enact 1937 — the year F.D.R. shifted, far too soon, from fiscal stimulus to austerity, plunging the recovering economy back into recession. Unfortunately, this advice was ignored.

But now I’m hearing more and more about an even more fateful year. Suddenly normally calm economists are talking about 1931, the year everything fell apart.

It started with a banking crisis in a small European country (Austria). Austria tried to step in with a bank rescue — but the spiraling cost of the rescue put the government’s own solvency in doubt. Austria’s troubles shouldn’t have been big enough to have large effects on the world economy, but in practice they created a panic that spread around the world. Sound familiar?

The really crucial lesson of 1931, however, was about the dangers of policy abdication. Stronger European governments could have helped Austria manage its problems. Central banks, notably the Bank of France and the Federal Reserve, could have done much more to limit the damage. But nobody with the power to contain the crisis stepped up to the plate; everyone who could and should have acted declared that it was someone else’s responsibility.

And it’s happening again, both in Europe and in America.

Consider first how European leaders have been handling the banking crisis in Spain. (Forget about Greece, which is pretty much a lost cause; Spain is where the fate of Europe will be decided.) Like Austria in 1931, Spain has troubled banks that desperately need more capital, but the Spanish government now, like Austria’s government then, faces questions about its own solvency.

So what should European leaders — who have an overwhelming interest in containing the Spanish crisis — do? It seems obvious that European creditor nations need, one way or another, to assume some of the financial risks facing Spanish banks. No, Germany won’t like it — but with the very survival of the euro at stake, a bit of financial risk should be a small consideration.

But no. Europe’s “solution” was to lend money to the Spanish government, and tell that government to bail out its own banks. It took financial markets no time at all to figure out that this solved nothing, that it just put Spain’s government more deeply in debt. And the European crisis is now deeper than ever.

Yet let’s not ridicule the Europeans, since many of our own policy makers are acting just as irresponsibly. And I’m not just talking about Congressional Republicans, who often seem as if they are deliberately trying to sabotage the economy.

Let’s talk instead about the Federal Reserve. The Fed has a so-called dual mandate: it’s supposed to seek both price stability and full employment. And last week the Fed released its latest set of economic projections, showing that it expects to fail on both parts of its mandate, with inflation below target and unemployment far above target for years to come.

This is a terrible prospect, and the Fed knows it. Ben Bernanke, the Fed’s chairman, has warned in particular about the damage being done to America by the unprecedented level of long-term unemployment.

So what does the Fed propose doing about the situation? Almost nothing. True, last week the Fed announced some actions that would supposedly boost the economy. But I think it’s fair to say that everyone at all familiar with the situation regards these actions as pathetically inadequate — the bare minimum the Fed could do to deflect accusations that it is doing nothing at all.

Why won’t the Fed act? My guess is that it’s intimidated by those Congressional Republicans, that it’s afraid to do anything that might be seen as providing political aid to President Obama, that is, anything that might help the economy. Maybe there’s some other explanation, but the fact is that the Fed, like the European Central Bank, like the U.S. Congress, like the government of Germany, has decided that avoiding economic disaster is somebody else’s responsibility.

None of this should be happening. As in 1931, Western nations have the resources they need to avoid catastrophe, and indeed to restore prosperity — and we have the added advantage of knowing much more than our great-grandparents did about how depressions happen and how to end them. But knowledge and resources do no good if those who possess them refuse to use them.

And that’s what seems to be happening. The fundamentals of the world economy aren’t, in themselves, all that scary; it’s the almost universal abdication of responsibility that fills me, and many other economists, with a growing sense of dread.

Esta vez, Europa está de verdad al borde del precipicio

¿Queda un minuto para la medianoche en Europa? Nos tememos que la política del Gobierno alemán de hacer algo que sirve ya de poco y llega demasiado tarde corre el riesgo de provocar precisamente una repetición de la crisis de mitad del siglo XX que la integración europea pretendía evitar. Nos resulta extraordinario que sea Alemania, precisamente, la que parezca no haber aprendido de la historia. Obsesionada con la inexistente amenaza de la inflación, da la impresión de que la Alemania actual otorga más importancia al año 1923 (el año de la hiperinflación) que a 1933 (el año en que murió la democracia). A los alemanes no les vendría mal recordar que una crisis bancaria europea ocurrida dos años antes de 1933 contribuyó de forma directa a la descomposición de la democracia, no solo en su propio país, sino en todo el continente. Llevamos más de tres años advirtiendo de que Europa continental necesitaba limpiar los lamentables balances de sus bancos. No hicieron prácticamente nada. Mientras tanto, desde hace dos años se está extendiendo un pánico silencioso entre los bancos de la periferia de la eurozona: se han reducido los servicios financieros transfronterizos, interbancarios y generales, y se han sustituido por financiación del BCE; y el dinero inteligente —grandes depósitos no asegurados de personas con altos ingresos— ha abandonado las costas de Grecia y otros bancos mediterráneos. Pero ahora el público está perdiendo la confianza, y el pánico puede extenderse a depósitos sin asegurar más pequeños. Si Grecia saliera del euro, se produciría una congelación de depósitos, y los depósitos en euros se convertirían en nuevos dracmas: por tanto, un euro en un banco griego no equivale a un euro en un banco alemán. Los griegos han retirado más de 700 millones de euros de sus bancos en el último mes. Más preocupante es que el mes pasado también hubo un aumento de las retiradas de dinero de algunos bancos españoles. La torpe operación de rescate de Bankia llevada a cabo por el Gobierno solo ha servido para incrementar la inquietud de la población. En una visita reciente a Barcelona, a uno de nosotros le preguntaron varias veces si era seguro tener dinero en un banco español. Este tipo de proceso puede ser explosivo. Lo que hoy es una tranquila visita al banco puede convertirse en una carrera de sálvese quien pueda. Si se produjera la salida de Grecia, las personas racionales se preguntarían: ¿quién va a continuación? Como se debatió en una reunión del Nicolas Berggruen Institute celebrada la semana pasada en Roma, la forma de salir de esta crisis parece clara. Resulta extraordinario que sea Alemania la que parezca no haber aprendido de la historia En primer lugar, es preciso establecer un programa de recapitalización —mediante acciones preferentes sin derecho a voto— de los bancos de la eurozona, tanto en la periferia como en el centro, directa a través del Instrumento Europeo de Estabilidad Financiera (IEEF) y su sucesor, el Mecanismo de Estabilidad Financiera (MEE). La estrategia actual de recapitalizar los bancos a base de que los Estados pidan prestado a los mercados nacionales de bonos —o al IEEF— ha resultado desastrosa en Irlanda y Grecia: ha provocado una explosión de deuda pública y ha hecho que el Estado fuera todavía más insolvente, al tiempo que los bancos se convierten en un riesgo mayor en la medida en que más parte de la deuda pública está en sus manos. Segundo, para evitar el pánico en los bancos de la eurozona —un fenómeno seguro en el caso de salida de Grecia y muy probable en cualquier caso— es necesario crear un sistema europeo de garantía de depósitos. Con el fin de reducir el riesgo subjetivo (además del riesgo del precio de las acciones y el riesgo crediticio asumidos por los contribuyentes de la eurozona), también habría que tomar otras medidas: 1. El programa de garantía de depósitos debe financiarse con los gravámenes bancarios apropiados: podría ser un impuesto de transacciones financieras o, mejor aún, un impuesto sobre todos los pasivos bancarios. 2. Es necesario poner en práctica un programa de resolución bancaria en el que los acreedores no asegurados —tanto mayoritarios como minoritarios— sean los primeros que paguen, antes de recurrir al dinero de los contribuyentes para cubrir las pérdidas de un banco. 3. Deben tomarse medidas para limitar el tamaño de los bancos con el fin de evitar el problema de las entidades demasiado grandes para caer. 4. También somos partidarios de un sistema de supervisión y regulación para toda la UE. Un euro en un banco griego no equivale a un euro en un banco alemán Es cierto que el fondo europeo de garantía de depósitos no funcionará si existe el riesgo continuo de que un país se salga de la eurozona. Garantizar los depósitos en euros sería muy caro, porque el país en cuestión necesitaría convertir toda la deuda a una nueva moneda nacional, que enseguida se depreciaría respecto al euro. Por otra parte, si el seguro de depósito solo tiene validez mientras el país no abandone el euro, será incapaz de impedir un pánico bancario. Por consiguiente, es necesario tomar más medidas para reducir las probabilidades de que se produzcan abandonos de la eurozona. Hay que acelerar las reformas estructurales que estimulan el crecimiento de la productividad. Entre las políticas que pueden conseguirlo están una mayor flexibilización monetaria por parte del BCE, un euro más débil, algún estímulo fiscal en el núcleo duro, más gasto en infraestructuras que reduzcan los cuellos de botella y faciliten el abastecimiento en la periferia (a ser posible, con una regla de oro para las inversiones públicas) e incrementos salariales por encima de la productividad en el centro para impulsar los ingresos y el consumo. Por último, dado el volumen insostenible de las deudas públicas y los costes de endeudamiento de varios Estados miembros, no vemos alternativa posible a algún tipo de mutualización de la deuda. En la actualidad existen varias propuestas de eurobonos. Entre ellas, la que preferimos es la de un Fondo Europeo de Redención que hace el Consejo Alemán de Asesores Económicos, no porque sea la mejor, sino porque es la única capaz de aliviar la inquietud alemana sobre la perspectiva de asumir un riesgo crediticio excesivo. El FER es un programa provisional que no derivará en un sistema de eurobonos permanentes. Cuenta con los avales suficientes y la antigüedad adecuada, además de tener unas condiciones muy firmes. El principal peligro es que cualquier propuesta que sea aceptable para Alemania supondría tal pérdida de soberanía fiscal para los Estados que sería inaceptable para a periferia de la eurozona, en especial Italia y España. Ceder parte de la soberanía es inevitable. Sin embargo, existe una diferencia entre federalismo y neocolonialismo, como nos dijo un veterano político en la reunión del NBI en Roma. Dado el volumen insostenible de las deudas, no vemos alternativa posible a algún tipo de mutualización Hasta hace poco, la postura de Alemania sobre estas propuestas ha sido siempre negativa. Es comprensible la preocupación alemana sobre el riesgo subjetivo. Será difícil de justificar el hecho de que se ha arriesgado el dinero de los alemanes si en la periferia no se llevan a cabo unas reformas sustanciales. Pero es inevitable que esas reformas tarden aún cierto tiempo. La reforma estructural del mercado de trabajo alemán no fue precisamente un éxito de la noche a la mañana. Por el contrario, la crisis bancaria europea es un riesgo financiero que podría dispararse en cuestión de días. Los alemanes deben comprender que la recapitalización bancaria, el seguro europeo de depósitos y la mutualización de la deuda no son opcionales. Son medidas esenciales para evitar una desintegración irreversible de la unión monetaria europea. Si todavía no están convencidos, deben entender que los costes de la ruptura de la eurozona serían astronómicos, para Alemania tanto como para el resto del mundo. Al fin y al cabo, la prosperidad actual de Alemania es en gran parte una consecuencia de la unión monetaria. El euro ha dado a los exportadores alemanes un tipo de cambio mucho más competitivo que el viejo marco. Y el resto de la eurozona sigue siendo el destino del 42% de las exportaciones alemanas. Sumir a la mitad de ese mercado en una depresión no puede ser beneficioso para Alemania. A la hora de la verdad, como reconoció la canciller Merkel la semana pasada, la unión monetaria siempre tuvo implícita en ella una mayor integración en una unión fiscal y política. Pero antes de que Europa piense en dar este paso histórico, debe demostrar que ha aprendido las lecciones del pasado. La UE se creó para no repetir los desastres de los años treinta. Ya es hora de que los dirigentes europeos —y en especial los alemanes— sean conscientes de que están peligrosamente cerca de caer en ello. Niall Ferguson es catedrático de la Universidad de Harvard; su último libro es Civilización: Occidente y el resto. Nouriel Roubini es catedrático en la Universidad de Nueva York y presidente de Roubini Global Economics. Ambos son miembros del Consejo para el Futuro de Europa del Nicolas Berggruen Institute.

Paul Krugman: 'I'm sick of being Cassandra. I'd like to win for once' | Business | The Guardian

By now you will probably have read an awful lot about the financial crisis. Perhaps I've been reading all the wrong stuff, but until now I hadn't managed to find answers to the most puzzling questions. If the crash of 2008 was preceded by an era of unprecedented prosperity, how come most of the people I know weren't earning much? Deregulation of financial services was supposed to have made us all better off, so why did most of us have to live off credit to keep up? Now that it has all gone wrong, and everyone agrees we're in the worst crisis since the Great Depression, why aren't we following the lessons we learned in the 1930s? President Obama is the only world leader who has attempted a Keynesian stimulus programme. Why has it been only minimally effective? Why do most other western leaders still insist the only way out is to tighten our belts and pay off our debts, when that clearly isn't working either? And how come the bankers, credit agencies and bond traders are still treated with cowed reverence – don't frighten the markets! – when they got us into this mess? These mysteries were beginning to make me feel as if I must be going mad – but since reading Paul Krugman's new book, I fear I'm in danger instead of becoming a bore. It's the sort of book you wish were compulsory reading, and want to quote to anyone who'll listen, because End This Depression Now! provides a comprehensive narrative of how we have ended up doing the opposite of what logic and history tell us we must do to get out of this crisis. Its author is a Nobel prize-winning economist who writes a column in the New York Times and teaches economics at Princeton University. An authority on John Maynard Keynes, Krugman wrote a book in 1999 called The Return of Depression Economics, largely about the Japanese slump, which drew ominous parallels between Japan's economic strategy and the pre-New Deal policies of the early 30s that turned a recession into catastrophic depression. At the time, unsurprisingly, most western economists weren't bowled over; in thrall to the seemingly endless boom, the Great Depression looked to them to be more or less irrelevant. Krugman's latest book will be much harder to ignore. He doesn't expect it will be an easy message to sell, though. "As far as I can make out, the serious opposition to the coalition's policy is basically a half-dozen economists, and it looks as if I'm one of them – which is really weird," he laughs, "since I'm not even here." Visiting London last week, he met lots of what he calls Very Serious People: "And there are lots of things these people say that sound very wise and sensible. But it's all upside-down; it's all wrong. Yet the power of their orthodoxy – even when it's failing – is quite awesome." These Very Serious People present economics as a morality play, in which debt is a sin, and we have all sinned, so now we must all pay the price by tightening our belts together. They tell us the crisis will take a long time to resolve, and must inevitably be painful. All of this, according to Krugman, is the opposite of the truth. Austerity is a self-imposed collective punishment that is not just unnecessary, but won't work. We know what would work – but for complex political and historical reasons that his book explores, we have chosen to forget. "Ending this depression," he writes, "should be, could be, almost incredibly easy. So why aren't we doing it?" Krugman offers the example of a babysitting co-op, or circle, in which parents are issued with vouchers they can exchange for babysitting hours. If all of the parents simultaneously decide to save their vouchers, the system will grind to a halt. "My spending is your income, and your spending is my income. If both of us try to slash our spending at the same time, then we are also slashing our incomes, so we don't actually end up saving more." We could issue more vouchers to everyone, to make them feel "richer" and encourage them to spend – which would be the circle's equivalent of quantitative easing. But if everyone is determined to save, the parents will hold on to the extra vouchers, and the circle still won't work. This is what's called a liquidity trap, "and it's essentially where we are now". The same principles apply to the "paradox of deleverage". Debt in itself is not a terrible thing, he says. "Debt is one person's liability, but another person's asset. So it doesn't impoverish us necessarily. The real danger with debt is what happens if lots of people decide, or are forced, to pay it off at the same time. High debt levels make us vulnerable to a crisis – and this is when you get the self-destructive spiral of debt deflation. If both of us are trying to pay down our debt at the same time, we end up with lower incomes, so the ratio of our debt to our income goes up." Crucially, Krugman continues, "what's true for an individual is not true for society as a whole". The analogy between a household budget and a national economy is "seductive, because it's very easy for people to relate to", and it makes some sense when we're not in the grip of a macro-economic crisis. "But when we are, then individually rational behaviour adds up to a collectively disastrous result. It ends up that each individual trying to improve his or her position has the collective effect of making everybody worse off. And that's the story of our times." At these moments someone has to start spending – and, Krugman argues, it is the government. But we're endlessly being told by the coalition that it has to pay off its debts because servicing the interest is ruinous, and the bond markets will destroy us unless we're seen to be tackling the deficit. "Well, now. We know that advanced economies with stable governments that borrow in their own currency are capable of running up very high levels of debt without crisis. And we know it, actually, best of all from the history of the UK – which spent much of the 20th century, including the 30s, with debt levels much higher than it has now." But what about bond markets? Invoked as global bogeymen, we're warned that they punish governments who fail to cut spending – even if cuts don't reduce the deficit. I've never understood why the markets should care how and when we reduce the deficit, as long as we can pay our way. According to Krugman, they don't. "That's the interesting thing. The actual verdict of the markets, for countries that have their own currencies, has been that they don't really care at all in terms of what you're doing in short-run policy." Likewise, the danger of being downgraded by a credit rating agency has been wildly overstated. "We saw it in Japan in 2002; they had the downgrade, and nothing happened. Which led us to predict that would happen for the US," whose credit rating was downgraded by one agency last year. "And it was exactly right. Nothing happened." A breadline in the US in 1930. According to Krugman, our governments have failed to learn the lessons of the Great Depression. Photograph: American Stock Archive/Getty Images Thus far, Krugman has essentially restated the case for Keynesianism. "And these are not hard concepts, actually. It's not hard to get it across to an audience. But it doesn't seem to play in the political sphere." What's fascinating is his historical analysis of why policy-makers, who once understood these principles, collectively decided to forget them. In the years following the Great Depression, governments imposed regulatory rules upon the banking system to ensure that we could never again become indebted enough to make us vulnerable to a crisis. "But if it's been a long time since the last major economic crisis, people get careless about debt; they forget the risks. Bankers go to politicians and say: 'We don't need these pesky regulations,' and the politicians say: 'You're right – nothing bad has happened for a while.'" That process began in earnest in 1980, under President Reagan. One by one the regulations on banking were lifted, until "we lost the safeguards, and it meant there was an increasingly wild and woolly financial system willing to lend lots of money". Politicians were in part persuaded to deregulate by the argument that it would make us all richer. And to this day, "there's this very widespread belief that there was, in fact, a great acceleration in growth. But this really isn't hard. You sit down for a minute with the national account statistics, and you see it ain't so." If we divide the period between the second world war and 2008 into two halves, "the first half is a really dramatic improvement to living standards, and the second half is not." It was certainly dramatic for the top 0.01%, who saw a seven-fold increase in income; in 2006, for example, the 25 highest-paid hedge fund managers in America earned $14bn, three times the combined salaries of New York City's 80,000 school teachers. But between 1980 and the crash, the median US household income went up by only roughly 20%. "So it's a total disconnect." Why would economists claim ordinary people were getting much richer if they weren't? "The answer, I think, has to be that you need to ask: 'Well who are the people who say these things hanging out with? What is their social circle?' And if you're a finance professor at the University of Chicago, the people that you're likely to meet from the alleged real world are going to be people from Wall Street – for whom the past 30 years have, in fact, been wonderful. If you're a mover and shaker in the UK, you're probably hanging out with people from the City. I think that is the story of the disconnect." But the influence of the top 0.01%'s mindboggling wealth didn't stop at finance professors. Their mansions and yachts and luxury lifestyles created "expenditure cascades", whereby, "if you're a little bit down the income distribution from there, you're going to feel some compulsion to match some of that too. And then, in turn, the people below you can feel some compulsion too." There were early warning signs, such as the savings and loans crisis of the late 80s, that should have alerted politicians to the dangers of financial deregulation, moral hazard and subsequent spiralling debt. But by then Wall Street's influence over policy-makers had rendered them deaf to alarm bells – in part because bankers were financing so many politicians' campaigns. Krugman quotes Upton Sinclair's famous observation: "It's difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it" – but more than that, he suspects the sheer glamour of wealthy bankers had a powerful influence over politicians. "My impression is that old style captains of industry can be rather boring. I'm not sure how much thrill there is in hanging out with someone like that. But Wall Street people are in fact very smart; they're funny, they're not company men who work their way up the chain. They're impressive." Even Obama is not immune to their charms, says Krugman. Early into the administration he met the president and his economics team, "and it was just clear that rumpled professors with beards just didn't come across as being so impressive. Yeah," he chuckles. "I had that definite sense." But even many of the rumpled professors had been seduced by the promise of a new world economic order, in which Keynesianism was not just redundant but faintly ridiculous. By 1970, Krugman writes, "discussion of investor irrationality, of bubbles, of destructive speculation had virtually disappeared from academic discourse. The field was dominated by the 'efficient-markets hypothesis'," which persuaded economists that: "We should put the capital development of the nation in the hands of what Keynes called a 'casino'." The death of Keynesianism was "triumphantly" announced, largely by Republican economists whose work had become "infected by partisanship and political orientation". Now, as they are faced with the catastrophic collapse of their theories, Krugman thinks political bias and professional pride are what's stopping them admitting they were wrong. Those economists cite the woefully limited impact of Obama's almost $800bn stimulus package as proof that they are still right. According to Krugman, the only thing wrong was it wasn't enough. Almost half went on tax cuts, and most of the remaining $500bn went on unemployment benefits, food stamps and so on. "Actual infrastructure spending – that's more like just $100bn. So if your image of the stimulus programme is: 'We're going out there and building lots of bridges' – that never happened." In an economy that produces $15tn worth of goods and services each year, $500m "is just not a big number". Back in 2009, Krugman had warned: "By going with a half-baked stimulus, you're going to discredit the idea of stimulus without saving the economy." And that, he sighs, "is exactly what happened. Unfortunately it was one of those predictions that I wish I'd been wrong about. But it was dead on." Since the crash Krugman has become the undisputed Cassandra of academia, but he jokes: "I'm kind of sick of being Cassandra. I'd like to actually win for once, instead of being vindicated by the disaster coming – as predicted. I'd like to see my arguments about preventing the disaster taken into account instead." The likelihood of that is a fascinating question. Krugman is not the most clubbable of fellows. In person he's quite offhand, an odd mixture of shy and intensely self-assured, and with his stocky build and salt-and-pepper beard he conveys the impression of a very clever badger, burrowing away in the undergrowth of economic detail, ready to give quite a sharp bite if you get in his way. His public criticisms of the Obama administration have upset many Democrats in the US, while his more vociferous criticisms of George Bush used to earn him death threats from angry rightwingers. I hope none of that gets in the way of his argument. What we need to do, Krugman says, is simple: ditch austerity, kickstart the economy with ambitious government spending, and bring down the deficit when we're back above water again. Most importantly of all, we need to do it now. "Five years of very high unemployment do vastly more than five times as much damage as one year of high unemployment. To say: 'Yes, it's painful, but time does heal these things … " He breaks off and sighs in despair. "Well, no. Time may not heal it."